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Capital Flight through Islamic Managed Funds
Rodney Wilson
In much of the Islamic World finance is asymmetric, as private wealth is, at least in part, generated locally but then invested in Western markets, a phenomenon which is referred to as capital flight. In contrast, Muslim governments mostly fail to raise sufficient revenue to cover their expenditures, and as a result they become dependent on international borrowing to fund their deficits. There is, in other words, varying degrees of private affluence and this is by no means confined to the oil-exporting states of the Gulf; at the same time there is public squalor and run down and decaying publiC services. To what extent can Islamic finance help solve these imbalances? Is the application of shari'a law a help or hindrance to the development of domestic financial intermediation and national financial markets in Muslim countries? As Islamic finance is by definition primarily of concern to Muslims, its adoption might be expected to result in capital markets of the Islamic World becoming segmented from global markets based on conventional finance. Indeed, Islamic markets might be ghettoised, which might imply losing out on some of the potential gains from globalisation, such as economies of scale in financing and lower transactions costs. On the other hand, global capitalism is often viewed as exploitative from a Muslim developing country perspective, with the gains from international financial integration unfairly distributed.
In this chapter the direcrion of Islamic investment is analysed. Financial flows through the Islamic Development Bank (lOB) are examined, as these involve recycling within the Muslim World, bur the main focus is on ourward porrfolio investment flows, especially those through managed funds. There is relatively little Islamic foreign direct investment, reflecting the failure of indigenous multinational companies to develop in most Muslim countries where governments are resistant to competing local centres of economic power beyond their control. The Islamic managed fund industry remains modest in scale, with assets worth less than $ I 0 billion, but it is qualitatively significant, as its experience demonstrates the constraints in redirecting Muslim capital flows to emerging Muslim markets.
ISLAMIC CAPITALISTS AND THE STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Governments in the Middle East have not only failed to attract significant amounts of Western capital through foreign direct investment, they have also been unwilling and unable to create the conditions for domestic Islamic capital accumulation. Ironically, it is in the much more liberal conditions of Western markets that Islamic capital is starting to flourish, and where mosr Islamic wealth creation is occurring as a result of outward portfolio investments. Domestic economic liberalisation in the Middle East is a necessary precondition for capital flight to be reversed, and for Islamic investors to feel that they are stakeholders in their own economies, rather than being globally footloose and nationally rootless. Governments and Islamic investors both recognise the links between money and political power, but while governments in the Middle Easr use their influence to monopolise resources, Islamic investors need more diverse, competitive structures and the economk space to pursue their own entrepren· eurial activities. In this respect, their needs are no different than those of Western capitalists.
Though frustrated by their own governments, a number of leading Muslim businessmen have nevertheless profited from agency rights they have obtained from the state, and enjoyed its protection of their monopoly privileges to initiate their wealth. Any patronage system, partly because of its inherent inefficiencies, is limited in its ability to transform millionaires into billionaires. For more serious wealth accumulation Islamic investors have therefore had to look beyond the state at the global marketplace, hence the trend towards capital flight. Saad Eddin Ibrahim referred to Saudi Arabian entrepreneurs as 'lumpen capitalists', believing that by the I970s, as a result of the oil boom, they no longer were traditional merchants, but yet at the same time they had not become entrepreneurial in the Western sense of taking risks with their capital.' Nevertheless, far from being a parasite and reaping profits without work, Ibrahim sees the Saudi entrepreneur as a 'cultural broker par excellence', interpreting the socio-political environment of the Kingdom to the outside world and vice versa. ' Contemporary Islamic capitalists are also cultural btokers, in the sense of acting as intermediaries between societies that are guided by shari'a law and the wider global economy that is largely based on Western modes of capital accumulation. Whereas in the 1970s and early I 980s, when tllere was much profit to be made in government contracts, especially in the Gulf, the Islamic capitalists relied on the state, by the 1990s, with a weakening economic role for the state, Islamic capitalists were seeking alternatives. One was to look at investment opportunities in booming Western markets, and profit from channelling capital -both their own and that of others for whom they acted as intermediariestowards these markers. Labelling such activity involving capital flight as Islamic finance made it more acceptable, especially if respected shari'a scholars could be persuaded to endorse the practice.
MUSLIM BELIEFS AS A CONDITIONING FACTOR IN INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR
A religion can get its teachings respected and enforced either by having government acting on its behalf or by persuading individual believers to act in accordance with their faith, or by some mixture of the two. Politicallslamists advocate the former, by having governments enforce shari'a law in all areas of human activity, including the financial sphere, as with Iran's Islamic banking laws of 1983. An alternative, and arguably preferable, approach is to support the provision of Islamic financing facilities to ensure that individual believers can manage their finances in accordance with Islamic teaching, while at the same time permitting conventional financial institutions [Q continue functioning. Such a dual system is found in the majority of countries with substantial Muslim populations, with the growth of Islamic finance driven by market forces rather than government dictate. In such a dual system, whether to use Islamic financial services is a matter of personal moral choice in a marketplace where there are differentiated products, some with ethical as well as purely financial characteristics. There are many parallels here between the ethical finance industry and Islamic financing, with marketing using moral suasion to appeal to conscience and stressing social benefits rather than simply private retums.
Muslim investors could be better served by Islamic economists and finance specialists than they have been up to the time of writing. In their discussion of lslamic economic agents, Farhad Nomani and Ali Rahnema focus on consumer behaviour, the stress being on moderation, but they remain silent on investor behaviour.' Ibrahim Warde does not treat the behaviour of savers and investors explicitly, although he does discuss problems of moral hazard in an Islamic context in relation to debt,' and there is a brief acknowledgement of the difficulties investors face in emerging markets. 5 The only discussion of Islamic investment funds has been by Muhammad Taqi Usmani, who serves as shari'a advisor to numerous Islamic banks and conventional banks offering Islamic financing and assct#management facilities. 6 Although the message of Islam is universal, most have taken national rather than internationalist perspectives, and have little to say about issues such as capital flight. Umer Chapra' refers to capital flight from Iran as one factor whose legacy adversely affected the Islamic banking system, but there is no discussion of country risk perceptions as a cause of capital flight. Chapra also correctly diagnoses the causes of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 as the mismatch between reliance on short-term dollar-denominated debt and longer-term lending in local currencies, which affected Muslim countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, but there is no anempt [0 provide a specifically Islamic critique.' There is, for example, the issue of whether government imposition of capiral controls is justified. On the one hand, such controls may prevent Muslims, adminedly the wealthy, from exporting their capital and earning potentially higher and less risky returns. On the other hand, controls may help maintain the value of the currency, keeping down the price of imported foodstuffs and other basic commodities for the poor, and ensure that local savings at least are deployed into national investments.
There has also been surprisingly little wrinen by Islamic economists on economic cooperation between Muslim countries. Although Munawar Iqbal exptessed his frustration that surplus funds from some Muslim countries and their citizens were nOt deployed in other Muslim countries lacking resources for development, he did not analyse why this was the case.' Similarly, Masudul Alam Choudhury applied the principles of lllweed and brotherhood to Islamic economic cooperation, but failed [0 suggest how such a programme of cooperation could be implemented in any practical sense apart from in the sphere of Islamic trade financing lO 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AS A MEANS OF PROPAGATING ISLAMIC LAW
Islamic finance was viewed as a potential unifying factor by the Muslim governments meeting under the auspices of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1973 and subsequently. The OIC was established as a forum for political dialogue between Muslim states on matters of mutual interest, including relations with the West and the rights of Muslims in Palestine. Some of its proponents, notably the government of Saudi Arabia, saw it as an alternative to the secular Arab League, which had been used, wholly unsuccessfully by Nasser, as a vehicle for Arab uniry, including economic unity. Rather than focusing on trade relations, as the Arab League had done, the OIC in the economic sphere emphasised financial relations, partly because trade between Muslim srates was only a small proportion of their tOral trade, most of which was with the West, and it was recognised from the ill-fated experiences of the Arab Common Market and the Arab Economic Unity Council, that it would be difficult to change this reality.
With the oil price increases of 1973-74, Saudi Arabia had vastly increased financial resources at its disposal, which could potentially be used [0 further the regime's international relations objectives, namely secure recognition as the guardian of the holy sites of Islam and counter criticism from both Arab nationalists and political lslamists that it was too closely involved with the United States. There was a continuing tension between the Kingdom's dependence on Western oil markets and the United States as a military protecror, and its desire for legitimacy as a defender of the shari'a law in the eyes of both Muslim governments and Islamist groups, at home and abroad, who were at best openly suspicious of Western and Zionist intentions, and, more often, virulently opposed ro western secularist values and the threat they posed to the Islamic World. [n the majoriry of Muslim countries, governments either ignored or suppressed such [slamist groups, but Saudi Arabia, a regime based on Wahabbi credentials, could not embark on a policy of suppression, especially as many of its own citizens shared the views of these Islamisr groups, and, in some cases, were prepared ro offer them financial backing in their struggles with their own regimes or the West.
Egypt depicted the 1973 war as a vicrory for the Arab cause due ro the efforts of its soldiers in crossing the Suez Canal and establishing a bridgehead in Sinai. Sadat argued that the oil price increases, which benefited Saudi Arabia but nor Egypt, had come about through its sacrifices, and therefore it was entitled to financial recompense. Other Arab states without oil, notably Jordan and the Sudan, assened that they were being forced to pay more for oil imports from their Arab neighbours, and more distant Muslim states such as Pakistan and Malaysia voiced similar concerns. Saudi Arabia's response was ro suppon the founding of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), with itself as the major shareholder. The initial paid-up capital was only $750 million, of which Saudi Arabia subseri bed $200 million, a modest sum in relation ro its financial resources at that time." By 2000, the paid-up capital of the IDB was almost $8 billion, which seems impressive but is modest in relation ro the financial resources of major global organizations such as the [nternational Monetary Fund, which is capitalised at $290 billion. Saudi Arabia's share of IDB capital is $2 billion, a substantial but by no means ovenvhelming commitment.
The IDB does nor finance projects in Saudi Arabia, but the Kingdom has benefited indirectly, as almost one-third of the trade financing by the IDB has been for oil imports, with one of the original aims of the new institution being to assist poorer Muslim countries without oil resources ro pay for their essential imports, especially after the oil price rises of 1973-74. The IDB has approved trade financing arrangements worth over $15 billion and project finance valued at more than $6.5 billion, as well as 340 technical assistance operations." In recent years, trade financing has involved a diverse range of commodities, including industrial intermediate goods ($3.2 billion), vegetable oil ($900 million), refined petroleum producrs ($769 million), fertilisers, phosphoric acid and potash ($465 million), rice and wheat ($459 million) and cotton ($367 million). Although these figures seem large, they refer to cumulative financing over the 1975-99 period, which averages out to approximately $1 billion per annum, a much smaller amount. By comparison, World Bank funding amounts to $17 billion per annum.
The lOB attempts to set an example by using shari'a-compliant financing methods, with much of the trade financing being offered through murabaha, mark-up funding with the bank purchasing goods on behalf of the importer and reselling them at a premium. Project finance has become increasingly important for the lOB in recent years, with much of the funding provided through leasing, (ijara) hire purchase (ijara wa-iqrina) and advance purchase financing (isrisna). Almost one-third of project finance has been for public utilities such as power generation plants, electricity transmission, and water treatment and distribution facilities, with over $1.5 billion used in this way between 1995 and 1999. Social projects account for a further quarter of the total, including schools and hospitals, with around $1.2 billion disbursed over the same period. Other project funding at this time was for transport and communications ($1 billion), industry ($850 million) and agriculture ($800 million).
With over twenty-five years' operational experience, it is appropriate to ask to what extent the lOB has achieved the objectives of its founders, and Saudi Arabia in particular. Clearly, with Muslim countries experiencing some of the lowest growth rares in the developing world, it has not been successful in fostering economic development. Nor has it achieved much in terms of encouraging the application of Islamic law in the field of commerce; indeed, some of the states it has supported generously, notably Turkey, at least until the 2002 elecrions became more secularist than ever, although it has permitted the special finance houses to operate, two of which, AI-Baraka Turk and Faisal Finance, are backed from Saudi Arabia. There have also been some benefits to Saudi interests in Egypt, notably with the establishment of the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt, although arguably this more accommodating attitude towards Islamic finance was more opportunistic on the part of the Egyptian government rather than because of any deeper commitment. More significantly, the lOB has acted as a vehicle for the improvement of Saudi-Iranian relations since 1997, with Iran subscribing an additional $1 billion to the bank as a concrete indication of its willingness to participate in pan-Islamic World projects in collaboration rather than in competition with its Arab neighbours,
The other important OIC organisation is the Fiqh Academy, based in ]eddah, which brings together experts in Islamic jurisprudence. Since 1986 it meets annually shortly after the end of Ramadan, the sixteenth meeting being held in Mecca from 5 ro 10 January 2002." Since its inception it has become arguably the most authoritative source of modern Islamic law and its fatwas are more widely accepted than those from any other source, at least in the Sunni Muslim World. This is partly because of the wide range of those represented at the meetings and the specialists in disciplines such as medicine and economics, who are on the fringes but often called ro give expert advice. The resultant farwas are respected, as not only are the rulings published but also the reasoning behind them. Consequently, the authority of alternative sources of Islamic law, notably AI Ahzar in Cairo, has tended ro be undermined. This has not so much enhanced the position of the Saudi Arabian government in relation ro the Egyptian authorities, but rather strengthened pan-Islamic law in relation to state laws.
THE EXTENT OF CAPITAL FLIGHT
The lower-income Muslim countries in the Arab World, South Asia and South East Asia all maintain controls on capital movements, with varying degrees of restriction on foreign exchange transfers ro fund investment abroad. Capital still moves abroad illegally, usually either through black market foreign exchange dealings. or the retention of hard currency earnings by exporters or migrant workers. These earnings are subsequently invested abroad rather than remitted into domestic currency. Due ro their illegal nature, it is difficult to estimate the extent of such transactions, although they are undoubtedly a significant source of capital flight.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have no restrictions on capital movements by local nationals, and their currencies are freely convertible and stable against the United States dollar. As a consequence, substantial amounts of private wealth are held abroad, as Table 6 .1 shows, draWing on Saudi American Bank estimates." The funds are mostly held in the United States, with pethaps over a quarter in Europe and the remainder in Asian markets, mainly Japan and Hong Kong. Funds are invested in equities, managed funds, government and corporate bonds, and residential and commercial property. The weighting of each investor's portfolio is determined by attitudes towards risk, financial market conditions and whethet the fundholdet is more concerned with receiving income Ot capital gains. Most of the investments are managed professionally, either through private banking or fund management groups.
In most tespects, the investment behaviout of the estimated 200,000 high net worth individuals from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf is little different from that of their counterparts elsewhete. Theit aim is to genetate income and wealth from their assets which benefits their families and themselves, whete the funds are invested being a less important consideration. How funds are invested is for many mote crucial than whete, as most Saudi Arabian and Gulf citizens, like Muslims elsewhere, are concerned about detiving income from interest, even though for the majority this concern does not translate into positive action. Some cleanse or purify interest income by donating it to charitable causes; others invest part of their funds in a shari'a-compliant manner to ease their conscience, while investing the remainder conventionally. In this respect, Islamic investors ate little diffetent to Western ethical investors, who tend to adopt a parrial approach rather than deploying all their funds ethically.
The professional advisors involved in the management of the assets of Saudi Arabian and Gulf investors ate often instructed to place the funds in accotdance with shari'a law. It is these instructions that have resulted in the growth of Islamic banking activity in international markets, notably London and Bahrain, where leading Western banks such as HSBC, Deutsche Bank, ABM Amto, Citibank Group and Merrill Lynch all offer Islamic financial products. Private banks are prepared to construct bespoke Islamic portfolios on their client's behalf, if they have sufficient funds to invest to justify the cost. Where portfolios include equities, investment in companies involved in alcohol production or distribution or pork products are excluded, as indeed are conventional banks because of their interest dealings, even though paradoxically the same banks are managing the funds. For clients with lesser amounts of funds to invest, Islamic mutual funds, the focus here, have become an acceprable alternative. Such 'off the peg' Islamic investment appeals to those who have insufficient funds to qualify for private banking services, or who do not wish to pay the fees levied for a personalised 'tailored' product.
THE GLOBAL ORIENTATION OF ISLAMIC FUNDS
As of December 2001, there were 105 Islamic mutual funds, of which 86 were equity funds and 16 were balanced or secured funds, the other three being Islamic bond funds offered by Malaysian institutions." The funds are classified geographically, as Table 6 .2 shows, with a preponderance of global equity funds, although North American, Asian and emerging-market funds are also significant. As most of the global equity funds hold over half their assets in the United States, the extent to which they are truly global is debatable.
This geographical emphasis is both a reflection of equity market realities and client perceptions. There are two major client groups, the dominant group being those residing in the Gulf, where there are no capital controls, as already indicated, and investors are free to deploy their funds anywhere. The second group is investors in Malaysia, Indonesia and to a lesser extent those in other Asian countries, who are primarily focused on their domestic markets, although some have access to dollar funds which they wish to invest globally.
There are also two factors explaining the direction of portfolio investment flows of fund management groups offering designated Islamic products. The first relates to the supply of available equity stock, which can be used to construct an equity portfolio to serve clients' needs. As dollar-denominated stock is sought, the United States is clearly the prime destination for portfolio flows, followed by dollar-denominated stock quoted in other markets. The second relates to the demand side, and that is ultimately a marketing issue. Clients are looking for a global spread, with a concentration on North America, as they know that stock quoted on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDEQ account for over one-third of the global total by stock value. Despite the setbacks of 2001 and 2002, there is an underlying confidence in the long-term resilience of the North American markets. Islamic-designated funds might be expecred to invest a greater proportion of their funds in the financial markets of Muslim countries -indeed, rhey are often criticised for not being more proactive in promoting inter-Islamic World portfolio investment flows, and taking money out, rather than directing it to cement greater Muslim World economic solidarity. One problem is that the restricted size of stock markets in Muslim countries reduces their absorptive capacity.
Simply pouring more funds into these markets would increases price-earnings ratios to levels that could not be sustained. I.
Another problem is country risk uncertainties, not so much with political stability but rather with inconsistent and poorly implemented macroeconomic policies that have failed to create the conditions for sustained economic growth. Ultimately, the returns in financial markets reflect economic success and, as Table 6 .3 shows, many of the economies of the Islamic World are extremely small, with very low growth rates and high levels of debt.
Even the United Kingdom's economy is over seven times the size ofTurkcy's, the largest in the Muslim World, a factor that is inevitably reflected in the size of its capital market. Furthermore, although the economic growth rate in the UK and the US was not especially impressive for the 1990-99 period, and even Ie s impressive subsequently, the absolute increase in gross national income per capita from a higher base is numerically much greater than that from a lower base.
Global marker volatility has inevitably had an adverse impact on Islamic funds. Conditions in major international equity markets, especially the New York Some promoters of Islamic funds, notably the international banks, have targeted the very wealthy and offered managed funds as a lower-cost alternative to a privately managed portfolio, which is more labour intensive to monitor and administer, overheads that can only be justified for those with at least $250.000 to invest. Lower thresholds can be offered for managed funds, as they are administered and monitored on a pooled basis, with the costs spread over several. or in the case of popular funds, many clients. In the Gulf, the target clients for Islamic fund promoters are not only the most wealthy segments of society, but rather uppermiddle-income bank clients who want additional avenues for their capital beyond savings deposits. Such deposits are not well-regarded by the devout, as they feel obliged to purify their income by giving away any interest-based returns to charity. Their main hesitation with respect to managed funds is the knowledge that their capital is at risk, even though in the medium to long term the hope is for capital gains.
The top twelve leading Islamic managed funds are listed in Table 6 .5, with the Al-Ahli Global Trading Equity Fund offered by the National Commercial To be viable and cover their COSts in the longer tenn, managed funds typically need to have assets under management of at least $50 million. Only three of the 105 Islamic funds are in that category at the time of writing, but the industry is new and much will depend on how much funding they attract during the upturn of the next economic cycle when international markets recover. Funds administered from Malaysia and the Gulf have lower administrative COsts than those managed from major international financial centres such as London. However, as much of the money is invested in Western markets, those with knowledge and experience of these markets are usually the be t managers. Therefore, many Islamic funds are promoted by leading Western fund management groups, Wellington of the United States being the market leader in terms of assets managed, as Table 6 .6 shows.
Wellington manages the AI-Ahll Global Trading Equity Fund and the much smaller Al Kawthar Fund promoted by the National Bank of Kuwait. as well as the Caravan Fund promoted by the Commercial Bank of Qatar. They also manage their own Hegira Global Equity Fund, but most of their Islamic fund assees derive from their links with the National Commercial Bank. Permal, a London subsidiary of Worms & Cie, a Paris-based conglomerate that grew out of a Swiss private wealth management group, look after the Alfanar Funds on behalf of SEOCO. Permal Asset Management is based in the United States, but it is the London subsidiary that manages the Alfanar Funds, although the latter are incorporated for tax and regulatory purposes in the British Virgin Islands. Deutsche Asset Management handle the secured funds offered by the National Commercial Bank, one of which is global and the other focused on European investment. Gulf International Bank is the only Arab-based fund manager of significance, as it manages the National Commercial Bank's Al-Ahli Asia Pacific and European Equity Funds. Wisely, the policy of the National Commercial Bank is to engage several Western fund managers so that their relative performances can be assessed on behalf of their Islamic investors.
As Table 6 .7 shows, the only other institution apart from the National Commercial Bank that has enjoyed success in amacting high-value investmenes into Islamic funds is SEOCO. This company is largely owned and managed by the Bin Mahfouz family, who were the founders and main owners of the National Commercial Bank until its takeover by the Saudi Arabian government and management reorganisation in 1997. This followed the deparrure of Khalid Bin There have been three reactions by the Islamic fund management industry to the global stock market volatility of 2000 and 200 I. The first is increased interest in a more diverse range of markets, including those of Muslim countries, with more domestic Islamic funds being marketed to local citizens. The second consequence is, as already noted, more interest in Islamic equiry funds with lower risks that aim to produce a reasonable dividend stream, rather than focusing on capital growth. Such funds invest in utilities or retailers rather than high technology companies, and are less subject to price volatility. Islamic funds of this type include the Al-Rajhi Balanced Funds, the AI-Ahli Secured Funds offered by the National Commercial Bank, the AI Hilal Fund promoted by the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank and the Faysal Shield Fund offered by the Shamil Bank of Bahrain.
The third reaction has been the emergence of more Islamic funds that are either based on Islamic bonds or on investment in real estate or other forms of property. The retums from property investments derive from the rental income, which is usually more stable than dividend income. There would also appear to be scope for the development of 'with profits' bonds, similar to those offered by insurance companies in the West, where returns are linked to equity performance but there is a degree of protection from downside risks. Bonuses, once declared, cannot be taken away but do not fully reflect capital gains and dividends payable. There is a revisionary bonus paid on maturity but penalties for early exit, usually within a five-year period. Islamic 'with profits' bonds may appeal to many Muslim investors investing for the medium teon in uncertain financial conditions, providing they are prepared to sacrifice liquidity.
In the aftermath of the events of September II th and the tragic consequences for Afghanistan and the Palestinians, there is a desire by Islamic investors to rethink their strategies for asset management and, if poSSible, to do more to help their fellow-believers in the Muslim World. Translating preferences into realities is not so easy, but as change can come in the longer term it is instructive to examine the flows from the Gulf to two Muslim markets to illustrate the opportunities and difficulties.
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT FLOWS FROM THE GULF INTO EGYPT AND MALAYSIA
It is unlikely that there will be a sudden flood of Gulf funds into markets such as those of Egypt or Malaysia, as there are restrictions on capital movements out of both countries which deter inward investors, and Egypt's ability to maintain the value of its currency is questioned as the t~nsions since September 11 th have caused tourists to think again about visiting the country, with arrivals well down on 2000 and fewer advance bookings. Around 20 per cent of Egypt's hardcurrency earnings are accounted for by tourism, mostly from Europe and the United States.
There is only one specialist Saudi Arabian fund that invests in Egypt, the AIRajhi Egyptian Fund that is managed by EGF Hermes in Cairo, although the AIRajhi Middle Eastern Fund also has around 22 per cent Egyptian exposure, the other major investments being in Turkey and Saudi Arabia (22 per cent each), and Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon and Bahrain (8.5 per cent each)." Both these AI-Rajhi funds are small, with a mere $10 million each under management. The AI-Ahli Arab Equity Fund offered by the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia invests in Egypt and other Arab League countries, but this is not marketed as an Islamic fund, and there is no screening of investments for shari'a compatibiliry.
There is no specialist Islamic fund in the Gulf focused on Malaysia or Indonesia, although the AI-Ahli Asia Pacific Trading Equity Fund, which is offered by the National Commercial Bank, and managed by the Gulf International Bank, does have some exposure to the Kuala Lumpur market. The AIAhli South East Asia Fund has even greater Malaysian exposure, but ir is not a designated Islamic fund. The Arab-Malaysian Unit Trust has marketed the Tabung Irtikal Arab-Malaysian Fund to Gulf investors since 1993, but the trust has no Gulf presence, its offices being in Kuala Lumpur.
LOCAL INVESTMENT IN THE SAUDI ARABIAN MARKET
The major investment in Muslim markets is simply domestic investment with Saudi Arabians and Malaysians investing in Islamic funds that offer a portfolio of local stock that has been screened for shari'a compliance. If investors have future anticipated liabilities in riyals or ringitt, then they will also want to have assets denominated in these currencies. The banks or fund promoters also have an advantage in their local markets, as they can manage the funds themselves, given their knowledge of their own market, rather than relying on international banks or fund management groups," Leading local within AI-Rajhi, most clients simply have current accounts that yield no return.
The National Commercial Bank has played the leading role in Saudi Arabia's mutual fund industry since the 1980s and it accounts for over half of the total funds under management. Irs first fund was launched in 1979, the Al-Ahli Short Term Dollar Fund. It largely invested in United States government securities and highly rated corporate bonds, and was conventional rather than Islamic in character, as rerurns were inrerest-based. In 1987 the National Commercial Bank launched its first Islamic fund, the Al-Ahli International Trade Fund, which provided investors with capital preservation but an income stream from short-term murabaha-based trade transactions. This was, to some extent, a response to the change in status of the Al-Rajhi to a banking and investment corporarion providing Islamic financial services, as the National Commercial Bank, as the leading bank in the Kingdom, also wanted ro stress its Islamic credentials, even though it was a conventional bank.
As Table 6 .8 shows, the total assets of Saudi Arabia's managed funds amounted to almost $10.7 billion by 2001, of which $4.6 billion was categorised as non-interest -or, in other words, Islamic. The assets of Islamic.designated managed funds exceed that of any other single category, with the AI·Ahli Global Trading Equity Fund offered by the National Commercial Bank being the largest Islamic mutual fund in the world, with funds of over $640 million under The largest local equity fund in Saudi Arabia is the AI-Ahli Saudi Trading Equity Fund. Its aim is to produce capital growth through investment in Saudi· listed stock, mostly in industrial and cement production, with this actively managed fund applying a higher management chatge of 1.75 per cent annually, but with a relatively modest minimum investment ofSR 5,000 ($1,333) . The AI-Ahli Saudi Trading Equity Fund has over SR 30 million ($8 million) under management, making it the largest local fund in the Kingdom, although its size is modest compared to that of Islamic global funds. It has produced a return of 22 per cent since its inception in 1998, and a return of 6.1 per cent for 2000.
LOCAL INVESTMENT IN MALAYSIA
In Malaysia, the leading local Islamic managed fund is the RHB Mudarabah Fund that has been operating since 1996. This is the largest Islamic fund in Malaysia, with over RM 194 million ($51 million) being managed on behalf of 2,800 investors." Almost 10 per cent of its funds ate invested in Telekom Malaysia, a further 10 per cent in local technology stock and a third in diverse trading services, with 7 per cent in both property and construction. The timing of the launch of the fund was unfortunate, immediately prior to the 1997 crisis, and the fund has lost over 20 per cent of its value since inception. In 1999, there was a return of over 36 per cent, but this was followed by a capital loss of almost a quarter of the fund's value in 2000. The other significant local fund in Malaysia is the Amanah Saham Bank Islam Fund, which has been successfully promoted by Bank Islam Malaysia to its own depositors as an investment vehicle that can result in capital appreciation. Unfortunately, it is difficult to outperform the market, and investors in this fund, which was instigated in 1994, have fared less well in recent years than prior to the Asia financial crisis.
As local Islamic investors in Malaysia have been deterred by the poor performance of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, three of the fund management groups have launched Islamic bond funds that aim at capital preservation and a tegular non-interest based income. The Islamic bond market in Malaysia developed in the I 990s with the issue of government and then corporate notes based on al bai bitMmen ajil, the sale of goods on a deferred-payments basis. Usually the notes were issued to cover equipment financing, the client settling by instalments that provided the income stream on which the security could be based.
Although there are objections in the Gulf amongst sMri'a scholars to bai al dawn. the sale of debt, as it is argued that those owing money should know their creditors. in Malaysia it is argued that as long as those being financed know in advance their debts will be traded. the issue of debt securities is legitimate.
The interest-based banking, alcohol, tobacco, gaming, insurance, pork production (and pork distribution), or other activities deemed offensive under Islamic law. A financial screen is also applied, as companies are excluded if their interestbearing debt-to-assets ratio is equal to or greater than one-third. The Islamic objection here is that companies that are too heavily dependent on Tiba-based financing should be excluded, but that some dependence is permitted on pragmatic grounds, otherwise there would be no acceptable companies to invest in." In practice, the movements of Islamic indices is closely in line with their conventional counterparts, the major exclusions affecting perfonnance being the stocks in conventional banks. When bank shares are doing well, there is an underperformance of the Islamic share universe, and when the conventional banking sector is performing relatively badly, the converse occurs. It is arguably appropriate to use these indices to compare the performance of Islamic dollardenominated global equity funds, but they are not relevant for looking at the performance of equity markets in Muslim countries. The more relevant indices for these purposes are the Standard and Poors International Finance Corporation (S&P/IFCI) emerging market indices for Muslim economies, as shown in Table 6 .9, which cover Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco and Turkey. As the table shows, 2001 was disappointing for all these markets, but 2002 saw a marked recovery in Malaysia and Indonesia.
Egypt was emerging market of the year in 1999, but subsequent performance has been poor. Saudi Arabia is not included in these indices, as foreign portfolio investment flows into the Kingdom are not permitted, with the exception of -23.4
Source: www.spglobaJ.com/indexmainemdb2000.hrml those from other GCC countries, in line with a policy of maintaining local ownership of companies. Non-GCC investors can only invest indirectly in Saudi Arabia by purchasing shares through specialist Saudi funds, the Saudi American Bank being the sole provider of such a fund at the time of writing. The Saudi American Fund is not classified as Islamic.
In many respects, the Saudi Arabian stock market is, with Malaysia, one of the two most interesting in the Islamic World because of its size. The capitalization of the market exceeds $100 billion, and there are 76 listed companies. This means it is the largest market in the Middle East, with the value of stock exceeding that of even the Russian market. A new electronic trading system, Tadawul, started functioning on 6 October 2001, enabling customers of the Kingdom's ten commercial banks to trade at most branches throughout the country.'" The market index rose by II per cent in 2000, and although in 2001 conditions were less favourable, with a modest fall in prices, the rise in trading volumes from January to the end of September exceeded 39 per cent.
JI The post-September II th period witnessed gains for Saudi Arabian shares as modesr amounts of capital were repatriated, with the market reaching an all-time high by June 2002, but prices subsequently fell back owing to increasing uncertainty during the build-up to the war against Iraq.
CONCLUSIONS
The Islamic mutual fund industry is largely focused on Western stock markets, rather than the emerging markets of the Muslim World. The flow of funds mirrors that of high net worth individuals from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf; indeed, those of more modest means are more likely to be risk-averse and wish to have their funds invested in more mature Western markets, rather than Muslim emerging markets.
There is, nevertheless, much political disillusionment amongst Saudi Arabian and Gulf nationals with the United States follOWing the war in Afghanistan 
